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Public Inputs and Endogenous Growth in the Agricultural Sector: 




Neoclassical models of growth (Solow, Ramsey) have been widely criticized 
because they cannot explain productivity changes. According to these models, growth is 
exogenously given by an unexplained rate of technical change. As a response, 
endogenous growth theories find that continuous growth is possible because of the 
existence of non-rival inputs of production (i.e., inputs that can be used by many firms at 
the same time or by the same firm repeatedly without additional cost). In these models, 
two necessary conditions for endogenous growth are: increasing returns to scale over all 
inputs and positive impacts of non-rival inputs on the returns to investment. The main 
contribution of this paper is to introduce a dynamic model of productivity measurement 
that incorporates public goods (non-rival by definition) as external factors to the firms. It 
also rationalizes the provision of public inputs by a benevolent social planner that 
internalizes the effects of them. Firms’ minimize intertemporal costs taking public inputs 
as given. Additionally, estimable functions that allow testing the necessary conditions for 
endogenous growth are obtained. 
Many other papers have focused on the effects of public goods on private 
production, and most of them have found a positive impact
1. For example, Aschauer 
(1989) pioneer work estimates a single production function for the US economy 
including public infrastructure as factor of production. Lynde and Richmond (1992) and 
Berndt and Hansson (1992) have also used duality theory to estimate the role of  
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infrastructure in private production in US and Sweden, respectively. Nadiri and 
Mamuneas (1994) estimate the impacts of public capital and R&D on the cost structure of 
twelve US manufacturing industries, and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) study the 
regional effects of public infrastructure on the US manufacturing sector. Both papers 
adopt a dual approach and find, in general, positive effects of public inputs on 
manufacturing productivity. The last paper also finds increasing returns to scale over all 
inputs (including infrastructure), but it does not include R&D.  
For the agricultural sector, papers like Antle (1983) and Craig et al (1997) find 
positive effects of public infrastructure and research on agricultural productivity but their 
approach is based on estimating a single production function. Binswanger et al (1993) 
estimates the impacts of infrastructure and R&D in India. They consider, in a static 
framework, that public infrastructure investments are regionally allocated toward areas 
that are more productive. In contrast, the present paper develops a dynamic model of 
productivity measurement in which the provision of public inputs is done by a benevolent 
social planner that internalizes the effects of them. The dynamic demands for private 
inputs can be jointly estimated. This approach maintains producer rationality and allows 
examination of the impacts of public inputs on producer’s behavior. 
The model is tested with data for the U.S. agricultural sector. U.S. agricultural 
productivity has increased at an annual average rate of two percent over the 1948-1994 
period. Some authors have found that productivity growth has been the main factor 
contributing to economic growth of the agricultural sector (Ball et al (1997)).  In this 
country, the provision of public goods in the form of public research and extension, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Exceptions are Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) and Holtz-Eakin (1994). They find insignificant effects  
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infrastructure has been sizable. In an atomistic environment, these public expenditures 
are traditionally justified because of their low degree of appropriability and high costs. 
Theoretically consistent firms’ dynamic demands for inputs can be estimated. Stocks of 
public capital and R&D are used as quasi-fixed factors. The existence of economies of 
scale and the likely positive impact of public inputs on the steady state stocks of private 
capital can be tested. 
There are several reasons to undertake this study. First, the possibility of 
endogenous growth in the agricultural sector may imply spillovers to other sectors and, in 
particular, may have important effects on the growth of regional economies based on 
agricultural activities. Second, by determining the substitution or complementarity 
between public and private inputs one may explain the recent evolution of private factors 
in the US agricultural sector. Ball et al (1997) show the increasing use of materials and 
the decreasing use of labor by the sector. Finally, the estimation of shadow prices for 
public capital and R&D stocks may provide an indicator to policy makers of the optimal 
provision of public investment. 
The paper develops as follow. Section II presents a summary of the endogenous 
growth theory involving publicly provided goods and the related testable hypotheses 
using a dual approach. Section III introduces a dynamic model in which both producers’ 
and government’s behaviors are rationalized. The testable hypotheses are then revisited. 
Section IV introduces the empirical model and section V presents the preliminary results. 
Finally, conclusions and future lines of research are stated in section VI. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of public infrastructure on private production.  
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II.  Growth Theory and Testable Hypothesis 
In the neoclassical models of growth (Solow, Ramsey), the rate of growth of per 
capita output is a decreasing function of the per capita stock of private capital. Without 
technical change and with a well-behaved neoclassical production function, the level of 
per capita output converges to a steady state where the growth of per capita private 
capital eventually stops. This result, implied by the assumption of decreasing returns to 
capital, has been one of the major criticisms to these models. 
As a response to these empirically unsustainable results, endogenous growth 
theory arose proposing different hypotheses. One of the pioneer studies has been that by 
Romer (1986). In this paper, Romer specifies a production function F(ki, K, xi), being ki 
and xi firm-specific inputs (x can be seen as a vector of inputs) and K an input external to 
the firm (“the level of knowledge” defined as a function of the “firm-specific knowledge” 
ki). By assuming that F is increasing in K and linear homogeneous in ki and xi, a perfect 
competitive equilibrium is still possible, but the factor ki no longer exhibits diminishing 
returns. Consequently, permanent endogenous growth of output per capita is allowed. 
Barro (1990) has developed a similar model where K can be interpreted as the 
stock of public capital (hereafter G). The intuition is that publicly provided capital (like 
roads, sewer capital, etc.) has positive effects on private production affecting the 
productivity of the firm-specific inputs. Public capital is assumed a public input that can 
be used by additional producers without cost. Consequently, total stocks of public goods 
enter in the production function of each individual firm. In this context, two necessary 
conditions for the hypothesized constant endogenous growth are: existence of increasing 
returns to scale over all inputs and existence of constant returns to scale over factors that  
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can be accumulated (private and public capital). A weaker requirement, alternative to the 
second condition, would be a positive impact of G on the demand for capital. Although 
not ensuring continuous growth, the presence of this nonrival input would imply a 
positive government’s contribution to growth.  
The above conditions can be tested using the theory of the firm. One can test the 
above mentioned conditions by estimating the total cost function of the firm including 
public inputs as quasi-fixed factors and all private inputs as variable factors. Thus, the 
cost function is C(p, G, Y) = p’X(p, G, Y), where p and X are the vectors of prices and 
quantities of inputs, Y is the vector of outputs, and G is the vector of quasi-fixed public 
inputs. In this context, increasing returns to scale can be directly tested. The effect of 
public inputs on the returns to capital, however, can be indirectly tested through the effect 
of these inputs on the demand for private capital. 
Increasing returns to scale are evaluated by considering the elasticity of cost with 
respect to output (ε cy). It is well known in the production economics literature that the 
elasticity of cost with respect to output is the dual expression of the elasticity of scale 
(η y): ε cy=1/ η y
2
. When the elasticity of cost with respect to output is less than one, firms 
exhibit economies of scale. However, in the presence of factors external to the firm, some 
adjustments should be made in order to obtain ε cy. Following Morrison and Schwartz 
(1996), the Le Chatelier principle implies that the adjusted elasticity of cost with respect 
to output is
3 
                                                 
2 See Chambers (1988) for details. 
3 This result comes from the identity C
A(P, Pg, Y) ≡   C(P,G(P,Pg,Y),Y). Taking the derivative with 
respect to Y on both sides gives  
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where the superscript A indicates that the elasticity is “adjusted” to take into account 
public inputs; ε CG is the elasticity of cost with respect to external factors; and ε GY is the 
elasticity of “demand for external factors” with respect to output. This demand elasticity 
should be interpreted as a long-run one representing the change in external factors 
necessary to maintain the firm on the envelope long-run average cost curve after a change 
in output. Finally, a value of 
A
CY ε  less than one indicates the existence of increasing 
returns to scale over all inputs (private plus public). 
The implied incentives to private investment are derived from the demand for 
private capital, K(P,G,Y). Thus, the derivative of K(P,G,Y) with respect to G gives the 
effect of public factors on the demand for private inputs. If this derivative is positive, 
then publicly provided inputs act as an incentive to the accumulation of private capital. 
Another interesting result is the estimate of shadow prices of public inputs. Using 




G indicates that increases in public input G diminish cost of 
production and, consequently, have positive effects on private production. 





















Finally, expressing as elasticities gives equation (1). 
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Note, however, that testing the hypothesized endogenous growth conditions with a 
cost function might imply specification errors due to the absence of dynamics. Models of 
growth consider capital as inputs that adjust gradually toward the steady state. In contrast, 
the static dual theory of the firm does not consider input dynamics and their transitional 
adjustments. The following section introduces then a dynamic model incorporating 
intertemporal optimization by firms and government. 
 
III. The  Model 
A dynamic dual model of the firm is used to explain growth based on the existence 
of public inputs. As was hypothesized, public goods might have positive effects on firms’ 
production. If the dual problem of the firms is considered, public inputs reduce cost of 
production given the level of firms’ output. In this sense, increases of public inputs 
increase firms’ productivity. This section introduces intertemporal optimization of 
economic agents: firms minimize intertemporal costs of production and the government 
(social planner) maximizes intertemporal welfare. Instantaneous adjustment of inputs is 
not possible because of the existence of cost of adjustment. 
Firms take public inputs as given. Public inputs are considered quasi-fixed inputs 
of production that they cannot adjust to obtain the minimum possible cost. However, the 
government, behaving as a social planner, observes producers’ surplus and provides 
public goods to maximize it, subject to the cost of providing the public input.  
The model adopted in this paper assumes that the government knows the payoff 
function of the firms. This assumption implies that the government knows how the firms 
react when public inputs are changed. The government behaves as a ‘leader’ and  
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optimizes first. Firms then take the level of public inputs as given and choose private 
inputs such that their cost of production is minimized. 
The dynamic of the model then works in the following way 
1.  The government decides the path of public investment Ig. This implies an 
optimal path of G (the stock of public inputs). 
2.  The firms observe the state variable G and determine the optimal path of 
private investment I (control variable of the firms). Consequently, the optimal path of 
private inputs Z (state variable) is also determined.
4  
The model can be solved by backward induction. First, the problem of the firms is 
solved. Then, once the payoff function of the firms is determined, the problem of the 
government is solved. 
The following figure shows the dynamics for the firms.  
 
                                                 
4 Note that for the firms, the controls (investment I) are strategies of the “closed-loop” type: the firms do 













Three average cost curves can be seen in the graph. ACS(Gt, Kt) represents a very short-
run average cost curve when private (capital (K) in this case) and public inputs are fixed. 
ACS(Gt) is the short-run average cost curve when only public inputs are fixed. Finally, 
ACL is the long-run average cost curve when all inputs are adjusted. At each period t, the 
firms observe the public input stock G and choose the optimal path of I that allows them 
to reach the optimal steady state (SS) stock K*. When the stock of public inputs is G0, 
firms choose an optimal path of I that allows the firm to reach K0
* at the minimum cost. 
The firm moves from E0 to E
’
0. The path is adjusted the next period when the stock G1 
implies a new SS stock K1
*. The firm then moves to E1. The two conditions for the 
hypothesized endogenous growth of the firms can then be seen in the graph: 
I.  Increasing returns to scale over the long-run average cost curve (ACL): negative 
slope of ACL. 
II.  Positive effects of G on the SS stocks of the private capital (i.e. the private input 
“that can be accumulated”): the SS of K increases from K0
* to K1
*. 
More formally, firms solve the following problem: 
t        0 ) t ( Z                               
Z ) 0 ( Z                               
Z I Z   to   subject               












      ( 3 )  
where C(.) is the variable cost function, y is output, Z is the vector of stocks of quasi-
fixed inputs, p is the rental price vector corresponding to Z, I is the vector of gross 
changes in quasi-fixed inputs, G is the vector of public inputs, and ρ  > 0 is the firm’s real  
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rate of discount. It is assumed that there is one perfectly variable input whose price is 
normalized to one. Thus, the elements of p are relative rental prices. 
Define now J(Z, y, p; G) as the value function that solves problem (3). Assuming 
that C(y, Z, I, p; G) satisfies the set of regularity conditions (A.1) – (A.6) and J(Z, y, p;G) 
satisfies properties (B1) – (B5) (see Appendix), duality between C(.) and J(.) can be 
established. 
 
Duality between C(y, Z, I, p; G) and J(Z, y, p; G):
5 any J(.) satisfying conditions (B) is 
the value function corresponding to C(.) that satisfies conditions (A) and is defined by 
 
)] Z I )( G ; p , y , Z ( J Z ' p ) G ; p , y , Z ( J [ Max ) G ; I , Z , y ( C z p δ − − − ρ =      (4) 
or 
)] Z I )( G ; p , y , Z ( J Z ' p ) G ; I , Z , y ( C [ Min ) G ; p , y , Z ( J z I δ − + + = ρ      (5) 
 
These two equations provide the relationship between the cost function C(.) and 
the value function J(.). They allow expressing the parameters of C(.) in terms of the 
parameters of J(.) when firms minimize intertemporal costs. Thus, the derivative 




1.  With respect to I:  
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CI(y, Z, I, p; G) = - Jz(Z, y, p; G), which must be positive from (A.2) or (B.2.ii). 
Testing for Jz(Z, y, p; G) = 0 is equivalent to test for adjustment costs in inputs Z. 
2.  With respect to Z: 
0 ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J p ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) ( ) G ; I , Z , y ( C zz z z < − − δ + ρ =
•
from (A.2). 
This expression gives the shadow price of quasi-fixed inputs. 
3.  With respect to y: 
0 ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; I , Z , y ( C zy y y > − ρ =
•
 from (A.2). 
This expression represents the output supply of the firms. 
4.  With respect to p: 
) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J 0 zp p
•
− − ρ =  
Then, 
] Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J )[ G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z p
1
pz − ρ =
−
•
, which is the dynamic demand for 
Z. 
5.  With respect to G: 
) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; I , Z , y ( C ZG G G
•
− ρ =  
This expression represents the shadow price of G when the firms are out of the SS. At 
the SS, the shadow price is 
) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; I , Z , y ( C G G ρ =  
If this expression is negative, the shadow price of G is positive, meaning that public 
inputs reduce cost of production. 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Epstein (1983).  
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Given these derivative properties, the two previously mentioned endogenous growth 
conditions can be tested through estimation of parameters of J(Z, y, p; G). 
 
Conditions for Endogenous Growth 
1)  The effect of G on 
a)  The cost function: this is provided by the fifth derivative property in the previous 
section (positive shadow price of G means that public inputs reduce cost of 
production). 
b)  On the dynamic demand for Z: it can be shown that the dynamic demand for Z 
can be expressed as 




           (6) 
where (.) Z
_
 is the SS stock of Z and M(.) is a stable adjustment matrix. This 
expression yields a flexible accelerator adjustment path for the stocks Z and is the 
reason for these dynamic models to be called “multivariate flexible accelerator 
models” (Epstein(1983)). The form of M(.) is determined by the functional form 
of C(.) but only under certain conditions can be successfully expressed as an 
explicit function of the parameters of C. 
The effect of G on the dynamic demand for Z can then be decomposed on the 
effect on the adjustment matrix and the effect on the SS stock of Z. The condition 
for endogenous growth would be for G to increase the SS stock of private capital 
K (one of the quasi-fixed factors of the firms). The effect on the adjustment  
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matrix is only an effect on the speed of adjustment toward the SS. However, it is 
still required for this adjustment to be stable. 
2)  Scale Effects: there must be increasing returns to scale over all factors of production 
(public and private factors). The shadow price of the public input is an “inverse 
demand” for it: PG = PG(Z, y, p; G). Then, solving for G, given PG, gives the direct 
shadow demand for G that can be substituted into (4) to get 
)] Z I ))( p , y , Z , P ( G ; p , y , Z ( J
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Taking the derivative with respect to y, we obtain the adjusted effect of output on 
cost when the ‘shadow demand’ for G also changes with firms’ output: 















At the SS, this expression becomes 
) p , y , Z , P ( G C C



















Completing elasticities gives equation (1) 




CY                (7) 





The government behaves as a benevolent social planner. It chooses the level of 
public inputs that maximizes welfare (producers’ and consumers’ surpluses minus the 
cost of providing public inputs). If a small open economy is considered, the output price 
is given. Assuming that public inputs do not affect utility of consumers, the problem of 
the government is reduced to the maximization of producers’ surplus. Then, in a dynamic 
model, the government solves the following problem 
t        0 ) t ( G                               
G ) 0 ( G                               
G I G   to   subject               













     (8) 
where J(.) is the value function of the firms that comes from their intertemporal cost 
minimization problem; Ig is the investment in public inputs which stocks are given by 
vector G; AC(Ig) is the government’s adjustment cost of G; δ g is the depreciation rate of 
G; r the rental price of G; and θ  is the government’s rate of discount. The existence of 
adjustment costs is justified by the multiple activities the government does with given 
resources. Increasing Ig means that the government must reallocate funds and resources 
used in the provision of some other public goods, like goods that provide utility to 
consumers or are inputs for producers in other sectors. This reallocation of resources  
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g(p, Z, y; r, G) as the government’s value function that solves (8). 
Assuming that J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) satisfies conditions (C.1) – (C.6) and J
g(p, Z, y; r,G) 
satisfies conditions (D.1) – (D.5) (see Appendix), duality between J(.) + AC(Ig) and J
g(.) 
can be established. 
Duality between J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) and J
g(p, Z, y; r, G): any J
g(p, Z, y; r, G) 
satisfying conditions (D) is the value function corresponding to J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) 
that satisfies conditions (C) and is defined by 




r g δ − − − = + θ         (9) 
or 






δ − + + + = θ        (10) 
 
These two expressions provide the relationship between J(.), the value function of 
the firms, and J
g(.), the value function of the government. They allow expressing the 
parameters of J(.) in terms of the parameters of J
g(.) and vice versa, when the government 
maximizes intertemporal welfare by minimizing producers’ cost. Thus, the derivative 
properties that characterize J(.) can be recovered from the parameters of J
g(.). 
                                                 
6 Note that assuming the objective functions of consumers and producers are separable with respect to the 
objective function of problem (8), the government can decide the optimal provision of different public 





1.  With respect to Ig: 
) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J AC 0
g
G Ig + =  
or 
0 AC ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J
g I
g
G > = − , 
This is positive given ACIg > 0. 
 
2.  With respect to G: 















G g G G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J r ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J ) ( ) G ; p , y , Z ( J 
This expression is the firms’ willingness to pay for G (shadow price) when the firms 
are at the steady state. If the expression is negative (condition (D.2)(ii)), then public 




r ) G ; p , y , Z ( J
) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J
δ + θ
− −
= −  
which could be interpreted as a ‘social’ shadow price: the net social benefit (the 
firms’ shadow price of G minus the government’s cost of providing G) adjusted by 
the ‘social’ discount rate plus the depreciation rate of public inputs. 
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r G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J 
or 









which gives the optimal path of G. 
 






z G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J 
or 




z z < − =
•
θ  
where the sign is given by condition B.2(ii): the value function of the firm is 
decreasing in Z. 
 






y G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J 
or 




y y > − =
•
θ  
where the sign is given by condition B.2(iii): the value function of the firm is 
increasing in y. At the SS level of G (or with no adjustment cost of G), 
0 ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J
g
y y > = θ   
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The following section presents the empirical model. 
 
IV. Empirical  Implementation 
This section presents the empirical implementation of the dynamic model 
presented in previous sections. Ideally, having data on r, the optimal path of Ig could be 
estimated. Nevertheless, the conditions for endogenous growth can still be tested through 
estimation of the dynamic demands for inputs. Adopting a flexible functional form for the 
value function, all parameters of interest can be recovered from the estimation of the 
dynamic demands for private quasi-fixed inputs and the demand for the variable input. 


































  ' A a ) Q , Z , P ( J 0      ( 1 1 )  
where Z is the vector of quasi-fixed factors, P is the corresponding vector of rental prices, 
and Q is the vector of output and public inputs; A and B are parameter matrices of 
appropriate order; a0 is a scalar parameter. 
The dynamic demands for quasi-fixed inputs can then be calculated from 
] Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J )[ G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z p
1
pz − ρ =
−
•
    (12) 
and the demand for the variable input (X*) is calculated from 
* Z ] J ' p ) G ; p , y , Z ( J [ ] P ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J [ ) G ; p , y , Z ( * X PZ Z p
•
− − − ρ =  (13)  
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Joint estimation of (12) and (13) gives all the parameters needed for testing the effects of 
public inputs on firms’ costs, steady state stocks of capital, and scale. However, the large 
number of parameters to estimate does not allow us to estimate this model with available 
aggregate US agricultural data.
7 For this reason, previous estimations based on a static 
model are presented here. 
The contribution of public capital and public R&D to US agricultural growth was 
then tested using a static duality approach. The study covers the period 1951 – 1992. A 
flexible cost function is specified, in particular, a translog cost function.
8 
In this study, the cost function includes: prices of private inputs (labor (N), 
intermediate inputs (M), and an aggregated measure of capital and land (K)); and stocks of 
quasi-fixed public inputs (public capital (G) and R&D (R)). Public capital stocks are 
constant-dollar values of federal, state, and local structures. Public R&D stocks are 
constructed from R&D spending using Huffman and Evenson’s method (1989). Finally, 
the output (Y) is a Fisher index of all crops and livestock products. All data is in constant 
1987 dollars.
9  
The adopted translog cost function is 
 
where ln C represents the natural log of the cost and X is the following vector 
                                                 
7 Authors are currently working on estimation of this model with recently acquired data for US agriculture 
at the state level. This implies estimation of a panel of 48 states and 23 years. It is planned to have these 
estimations by July 2001.  
8 Normalized Quadratic and Generalized Leontief have also been used, but results showed that high 
multicolinearity affected the estimation of these functional forms. 
(14)                                                   X  X'
2
1
'X 0  C ln β + α + α = 
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The cost C, the price of labor (Pn) and the price of capital (Pk) are normalized by the price 
of materials. The properties of symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices are imposed, 
and the parameters corresponding to the price of materials can be obtained from the 
appropriate combination of α  and β . 
By first-order differentiation of the translog cost function, one gets the share 
equations: 
 
where S is a column vector consisting of private input shares, the output share, and the 
‘shadow’ shares of the public inputs. Note again that the shares of output and private 
inputs must be positive, while the ‘shadow’ share of public inputs must be negative for 
the public inputs to reduce costs.
10 
Once the parameters of the cost function are estimated, the conditions 
hypothesized by the postulated endogenous growth theory can be tested. The condition of 
increasing returns to scale is tested by calculating the elasticities involved in (1). The 
possible positive effect of public inputs on the demand for private capital is checked by 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 See Ball et al. (1997) for details on all agricultural data. Public capital stocks are from Survey of Current 
Business and include buildings, highways, streets, sewer structures etc. Military structures are excluded. 






























(15)                                                                         X S β + α = 
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obtaining Allen elasticities of substitution. In particular, if the Allen elasticities of 
substitution between private capital and public factors are positive, the condition of 
positive government contribution to private capital accumulation is satisfied. 
The model also allows one to get another interesting result: the shadow prices of 
public inputs. Following equation (2), the implicit price of G and R is given by 
 
where Q represents G and R, and subscripts i and j are used to distinguish between them. 
A positive PQi
* implies that the external factor Qi reduces the cost of private production.  
 
V. Results 
The translog cost function, the input shares of labor and capital, and the output 
share were jointly estimated imposing symmetry constraints among parameters. The cost 
and the prices of labor and capital were normalized by the price of materials. Since the 
paper uses highly aggregated data, iterative three stages least squares (I3SLS) was 
adopted. Iterations were shown by Barten (1969) to lead to estimates that are invariant to 
the equation chosen for deletion. Fitted values from the regressions of the logs of Pn/Pm, 
Pk/Pm and Y on a set of exogenous variables were used. The set of exogenous variables 
used as instruments includes total US population, number of non-farm workers, effective 
land tax ratios, interest rate charged by land banks, total agricultural exports, total non-
agricultural exports, and time. The adjusted R
2s were 0.775, 0.926, and 0.975 for the logs 
of Pn/Pm, Pk/Pm and Y estimations, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 This is the monotonicity property. 
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Table 1A presents the parameter estimates of the I3SLS estimation. In addition to 
the imposed properties of symmetry and homogeneity, monotonicity and concavity are 
properties of the cost function that cannot be imposed globally. However, they are 
checked at each data point. Monotonicity in output and private inputs is satisfied in all the 
observations. The concavity property, in contrast, is satisfied in 22 of the 42 years of the 
sample. This result implies that the parameter estimates are not consistent with the theory 
in almost half of the sample. Thus, estimates that are more reliable and consistent with the 
theory should be obtained. 
Table 1B presents Bayesian parameter estimates that satisfy concavity and 
monotonicity in output and private inputs. The procedure developed by Geweke(1986) 
was used. The concavity and monotonicity properties were introduced as prior beliefs 
given by the neoclassical theory of the firm. In this way, these restrictions are introduced 
using Bayesian inference and inequality constrained estimation. The result of this 
procedure is a posterior distribution for parameters that is conditional on the observed 
data. Using the Monte Carlo method, 20,000 replications were drawn from a multivariate 
normal distribution with mean and covariance matrix given by the I3SLS parameter 
estimates and their covariance matrix. For each replication, the substitution matrix was 
obtained and the eigenvalues were computed.
11,12 The Bayesian estimate is the mean of 
the replications that satisfy the restrictions when a quadratic loss function is adopted. The 
number of replications that satisfy the curvature and monotonicity constraints is 12,626, 
which represents 63% of the replications. This proportion is interpreted as the probability 
                                                 
11 The substitution matrix was evaluated at the mean. 
12 It should be noted that the monotonicity constraint was not binding.  
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that concavity holds. The parameter estimates in Table 1B are then the mean of the 
posterior distribution using the 12,626 replications.
13 
Table 2 presents the estimated shadow prices of public inputs using the Bayesian 
estimates. First, note that the shadow price of public capital is negative, although 
insignificant for some periods. This result contradicts the property of monotonicity in 
public inputs. This property is required under the assumption that the government behaves 
as a benevolent social planner that provides public inputs.
14 When this property was 
introduced as a prior belief in the estimation, no replication of the 12,626 satisfied it. 
In contrast, the shadow price of public R&D has been positive and significantly 
different from zero for the entire sample period. This implies that public R&D reduces 
private costs of production. For example, an increase of 1 billion dollars in the stock of 
public R&D reduces the cost of the agricultural sector in 2 million dollars. 
Endogenous growth conditions imply tests for long-run increasing returns to scale 
and impacts of G and R&D on the demand for capital. Table 3 presents Allen elasticities 
of substitution and output elasticities of demand. Note that Allen elasticities between 
private inputs and public inputs are negative, indicating substitutability between them. In 
particular, the substitutability between public inputs and capital is opposed to the 
hypothesis of complementarity given by the postulated endogenous growth theory: 
increases in public inputs reduce the demand for private capital. 
From the same table, other results of interest can be inferred. For example, the 
substitutability between labor and public R&D helps to explain the evolution of labor 
                                                 
13 For further details on Bayesian estimation, see Geweke (1986), Chalfant et al (1987), and Chalfant et al 
(1989). 
14 This is equivalent to condition (D.2)(ii) in the dynamic model.  
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usage over the sample period. In contrast, the substitutability between public R&D and 
materials does not support the increasing use of this private input. Hence, R&D seems to 
have been a substitute of labor, materials and capital. 
Finally, Table 4 shows the adjusted elasticity of cost with respect to output and its 
components. Note that the traditional measure, ε cy, has been less than one for the whole 
sample period indicating the possibility of increasing returns to scale. When the 
adjustment is done, increases in output, along with increases in public R&D, increase 
agricultural costs even in a smaller proportion (given the negative value of the elasticity of 
cost with respect to R&D, consistent with positive shadow prices). Thus, the returns to 
scale are ‘even more increasing’ when this measure is adjusted for the presence of public 
R&D, result that is consistent with the first hypothesis of the postulated endogenous 
growth theory. However, the adjusted elasticity of cost with respect to output presented in 




The paper has presented a dynamic model to measure the contribution of public 
inputs on productivity growth. It has also shown testable hypotheses related with the main 
postulates of a version of endogenous growth theory (‘AK’ models with public goods) 
using duality theory. In particular, two conditions have been postulated and preliminary 
tested with a static approach. One is the existence of increasing returns to scale over all 
inputs (private and public). The other one is the positive effect of public inputs on the 
demand for private factors that can be accumulated (capital). Although the second  
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condition is not satisfied, there is some evidence that public R&D may have contributed to 
the existence of increasing returns to scale. With respect to the second condition, however, 
public R&D stocks appear to have been a substitute of private inputs. This helps to explain 
the decreasing use of labor, but it does not explain the decreasing use of materials. 
Additionally, public infrastructure is insignificant for some years. This result stands in 
contradiction to the monotonicity property necessary for public inputs under the 
hypothesized government’s behavior. It also contradicts previous results obtained for the 
manufacturing sector. 
Finally, more work is needed to overcome the limitations of this paper. The use of 
time series may originate problems due to the presence of nonstationary data. In this 
sense, future work should look at long-run relationships among variables. One way of 
overcoming this problem is to consider a cointegration approach. However, the large 
number of parameters to estimate relative to the sample size makes this task difficult. 
Another alternative approach is the use of panel data, estimating the model at the state 
level. This approach can improve this study in both theoretic and econometric aspects. In 
terms of theoretic aspects, panel estimation at the state level could also allow for the 
presence of spillover effects as well as different patterns of growth in each state. In terms 
of econometric, the larger number of degrees of freedom allows estimation of the dynamic 
model overcoming possible specification problems. Clearly, a model that introduces 
dynamics and panel data is the direction to follow.
15 
                                                 
15 Again, authors are currently working on this.  
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APPENDIX 
This appendix presents conditions (A) to (D) that guarantee duality between cost 
and value functions of the firms, and between value function of the firms and the one of 
the government. 
Conditions (A) 
It is assumed that C(y, Z, I, p; G) satisfies the following set of regularity conditions: 
(A.1)  C(y, Z, I, p; G) ≥  0. 
(A.2)  C(y, Z, I, p; G) is increasing in (y,I) and decreasing in Z. 
(A.3)  C(y, Z, I, p; G) is convex in I. 
(A.4)  For each (Z0, y, p; G) a unique solution exists for (3). This means that there are 
well-defined factor demand functions associated with (3). 
(A.5)  For each (Z0, y, p; G), problem (3) has a unique steady state (SS) stock  ) G ; p , y ( Z
_
 
that is globally stable. (Uniqueness and stability of the SS). 
(A.6)  For any (Z0, y, p; G), there exists p
^
 such that I
^
 is the optimal gross investment 
vector at t = 0 in (3) given (Z0, y, p; G). 
 
Conditions (B) 
It is assumed that the value function J(Z, y, p; G) satisfies the following properties: 
(B.1)  J(Z, y, p; G) ≥  0. 
(B.2)   (i)   0 ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J p ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) r ( zz z < − − δ +
•
. (this expression is 
dual  to Cz < 0). 
          (ii)  Jz(.) < 0. (dual to CI(.) > 0)  
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          (iii)  0 (.) * Z (.) J (.) J yz y > − ρ
•
 (dual to Cy(.) > 0), where 
] Z (.) J (.)[ J ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z p
1




(B.3)  The following expression is concave in p: 
) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J pZ ) G ; p , y , Z ( J z
•
− − ρ  
Under some specific functional forms (like the normalized quadratic presented 
above), Jz is linear in p and the curvature requirement reduces to concavity of J(.) 
in p. This condition is dual to (A.3). 
(B.4) Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( * I δ + ≡
•
 and X
*(Z, y, p;G) are positive. X
*(Z, y, p;G) is 
defined as the demand for the variable input. 
(B.5)  The stock profile that solves  ] Z (.) J (.)[ J (.) * Z p
1
pz − ρ =
−
•
, Z(0) > 0, has a unique 
globally stable SS  ) G ; p , y ( Z
_
. 
Then, under conditions (A) and (B), duality between C(.) and J(.) can be established as in 
equations (4) and (5). 
 
Conditions (C) 
It is assumed that J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) satisfies the following conditions: 
(C.1)  J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) ≥  0 
(C.2)  (i) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is increasing in Ig. Given that J(.) is independent of Ig, 
AC(.) must be increasing in Ig.  
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(ii) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is decreasing in G. Given that AC(.) is independent of 
G, J(.) must be decreasing in G. 
(C.3)  J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is convex in Ig. Then, AC(.) must be convex in Ig. 
(C.4)  For each (Z, p, y, r, G0), there exists a unique solution for (8). (There are well-
defined supplies of public inputs). 
(C.5)  For each (Z, p, y, r, G0), (8) has a unique steady state (SS) stock  ) r , y , p , Z ( G
_
 
that is globally stable. 
For any (Z, p, y, r, G0), there exists 
^
r such that  g
^
I  is the optimal public gross investment 
vector at t = 0 in (2), given (Z, p, y, r, G0). 
 
Conditions (D) 
It is assumed that J
g(y, Z, p; r, G) satisfies the following conditions: 
(D.1) J
g(y, Z, p; r, G) ≥  0 
(D.2) (i)  0 (.) J
g
G < . This expression is dual to (C.2)(i):  0 (.) ACIg > (there are 
adjustment costs in the provision of public inputs). 




G g < −
•
δ + θ . This expression is dual to (C.2)(ii): 
0 (.) JG < (positive shadow prices of public inputs). Given  0 (.) J
g
G < , it is 
sufficient for (D.2)(ii) to hold that  0 (.) J
g
GG < −  (increases of the public 
good decrease the shadow price of it).  
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θ − −  must be concave in r. This is dual to 
condition (C.3). 
(D.4)  G ) r ; y , p , Z ( * G ) r ; y , p , Z ( I g
*
g δ + ≡
•
 is positive. 
(D.5)  The stocks that solves  ] G (.) J (.)[ J ) r ; y , p , Z ( * G g
r
1 g
Gr − = θ
−
•
, with G(0) > 0, has a 
unique globally stable SS  ) r ; y , p , Z ( G
_
. 
Then, under conditions (C) and (D), duality between J
g(.) and J(.) + AC(Ig) can be 
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I3SLS PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error Parameter Estimate   Std. Error
α 0  -102.590* 57.881  β ky  -0.044* 0.026 
α n  4.459** 0.532  α g  36.865** 13.840 
α k  -0.639 0.728  α r  -44.703** 12.686 
β nn  0.026 0.039  α y  0.194 1.467 
β nk  -0.029** 0.011  β gg  -4.942** 1.592 
β ng  -0.220** 0.044  β gr  4.740** 1.272 
β nr  -0.130** 0.049  β gy  -0.193* 0.106 
β ny  0.171* 0.098  β rr  -3.281** 0.830 
β kk  0.089** 0.016  β ry  0.468** 0.143 
β kg  0.011 0.074  β yy  -0.367 0.311 
β kr  0.111** 0.050       
* Significant at 90% 





BAYESIAN PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Error Parameter Estimate   Std. Error
α 0  -103.240* 58.098  β ky  -0.044 0.027 
α n  4.462** 0.528  α g  36.999** 13.887 
α k  -0.652 0.726  α r  -44.789** 12.694 
β nn  0.026 0.038  α y  0.207 1.459 
β nk  -0.029** 0.011  β gg  -4.956** 1.598 
β ng  -0.221** 0.043  β gr  4.758** 1.276 
β nr  -0.139** 0.048  β gy  -0.194* 0.106 
β ny  0.171* 0.095  β rr  -3.285** 0.835 
β kk  0.089** 0.016  β ry  0.468** 0.143 
β kg  0.012 0.074  β yy  -0.365 0.311 




ESTIMATED SHADOW PRICES* 
Period Pg* T-Ratio  Period Pr* T-Ratio 
1951-1959  -.0000020 -1.98  1951-1959 0.00653 3.66 
1960-1969  -.0000002 -0.39  1960-1969 0.00215 2.60 
1970-1979  -.0000009 -1.57  1970-1979 0.00086 2.62 
1980-1992  -.0000028 -3.45  1980-1992 0.00143 5.87 
1951-1992  -.0000014 -2.69  1951-1992 0.00164 5.01 





ALLEN ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION 
AND OUTPUT ELASTICITIES* 
Elasticity 1951-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1992 
σ nn  -0.78 -1.30 -2.30  -3.30 
σ mm  -1.36 -1.26 -1.08  -1.07 
σ kk  -0.61 -1.72 -1.30  -1.02 
σ nm  1.02 1.02 1.03  1.04 
σ nk  0.49 0.66 0.65  0.62 
σ km  -0.54 0.27  0.54  0.62 
σ ng  -0.43 3.66  0.40  -0.46 
σ mg  -1.81 -5.75 -1.87  -1.25 
σ kg  -1.15 -1.47 -1.07  -1.02 
σ nr  -1.14 -1.44 -2.06  -1.58 
σ mr  -0.96 -0.90 -0.86  -0.94 
σ kr  -0.45 -0.34 -0.25  -0.75 
σ ny  1.45 1.61 1.83  1.99 
σ my  0.50 0.51 0.59  0.65 
σ ky  0.42 0.70 0.81  0.86 
* Evaluated at sample means 
 
TABLE 4 
ADJUSTED ELASTICITY OF COST 
WITH RESPECT TO OUTPUT* 
Elasticity 1951-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1992 
ε cy  0.70 0.69 0.75  0.85 
ε cg  0.72 0.12 0.57  2.02 
ε cr  -1.88 -0.78 -0.48  -1.18 
ε gy  -0.07 -0.023 -0.05  -0.218 
ε ry  0.10 0.015  -0.028  0.091 
ε
A
cy  0.47 0.677 0.731  0.304 
* Evaluated at sample means 
 